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THE MINIMUM WAGE DECISION
GEORGE

W. Gomm.*

In the combined cases of Adkins v. Children'sffospitaland
Same v. Lyons' the Supreme Court has again rendered a decision
which has been the subject of severe criticism from many sources.
The cases involved the validity of the District of Columbia
minimum wage law. Congress passed an act creating a Minimum Wage Board which was to "ascertain and declare what
wages were inadequate to supply the necessary cost of living
to women workers, to maintain them in good health and to proteet their morals," and was empowered "to fix standards of
minimum wages for women in any occupation" in the District
of Columbia.
In two cases in which one decision was rendered the validity
of this act was questioned. In the first case a hospital for whose
nurses wages had been fixed by the Minimum Wage Board, instituted a suit to restrain the board from enforcing its order. In
the second, a woman who had been operating an elevator in the
Congress Hotel in Washington was discharged because of the
hotel's inability to pay the price set by the board. She also.
asks for an injunction against the enforcement of the order of
the board. In both of these eases the constitutionality of the
minimum wage act was questioned on the ground that it was an
unjustifiable interference by Congress with the liberty of contract. The cases involve the old problem of drawing the line
between two contending principles-the police power on the one
hand, which enables congressional action, and the constitutional
guarantee against deprivation of liberty, on the other hand which
denies the power of congressional action. Does the police power
protect the law's validity, or does the constitutional guarantee
destroy it?
*Professor of Law, University of Iinois.
(1923) 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394.
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Many times it has been decided 2 that if the public health or
morals are sufficiently needy of correction, Congress is enabled
through the police power to furnish the correction. But if the
public health or morals are not sufficiently needy Congress is disabled, through the constitutional guarantees to furnish the correction.
In order to sustain the constitutionality of a law under the
police power it must appear (1) that there was a general need
for some law, i. e., that there was a health evil, moral evil, or
some other public evil, which needed correction, ai.d (2) that
the proposed law is reasonably calculated to remedy to some
extent such evil.
In the instant case the evil appears to have been the existence of immorality and poor health among women workers in the
city of Washington, as well as their inequality with their employers in bargaining power. These facts seem not to have been
seriously denied. The whole controversy was upon the question
as to whether or not the requirement that employers shall pay a
certain minimum wage, was reasonably calculated to remove to
any- extent the evil. The majority of the court held that the
legislation would not remedy the evil and that therefore the
police power could not be invoked to sustain the validity of the
law. But a vigorous minority, Chief Justice Taft and Justices
Sanford and Holmes, thought that the means used by Congress
to remedy the situation could not be said to be unreasonable,
and that therefore Congress had power to enact the law.
The case seems close. Much can be said to support either
view. But it is believed that the minority opinions follow more
closely the guiding principles formerly enunciated by the Court.
Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the court, points out very
forcibly many instances of the law's unreasonable operation,
and cases where it would seem to work positive injustice and
make unnecessary discriminations. His language is:
"The price fixed by the board need have no relation to the capacity
or earning power of the employee, the number of hours which may
happen to constitute the day's work, the character of the place where
the work is to be done, or the circumstances or surroundings of the
employment, and, while it has no other basis to support its validity than
2MuIn v. Il. (1876), 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77; Brass v. North
Dakota (1894), 153 U. S. 391; German Afliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1914),
233 U. S. 389; Bockc v. Hirsk (1921), 256 U. S. 135, 65 L. Ed. 865, 16 A.
L. R. 165.
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the assumed necessities of the employee, it takes no account of any independent resources she may have. It is based wholly on the opinions
of the members of the board and their advisers-perhaps an average of
their opinions, if they do not precisely agree-as to what will be necessary to provide a living for a woman, keep her in health and preserve
her morals. It applies to any and every occupation in the district, without regard to its nature or the character of the work.
"..
. What is sufficient to supply the necessary cost of living for
a woman worker and maintain her in good health and protect her morals
Is obviously not a precise or unvarying sum-not even approximately
so. The amount will depend upon variety of circumstances: The individual temperament, habits of thrift, care, ability to buy necessaries
intelligently, and whether the woman live alone or with her family. To
those who practice economy, a given sum will afford comfort, while to
those of contrary habit the same sum will be wholly inadequate. The
co-operative economies of the family group are not taken into account,
though they constitute an important consideration in estimating the
cost of living, for it is obvious that the individual expense will be less
In the case of a member of a family than in the case of one living alone.
The relation between earnings and morals is not capable of standardization. It cannot be shown that well-paid women safeguard their morals
more carefully than those who are poorly paid. Morality rests upon
Dther considerations than wages, and there is, certainly, no such prevalent connection between the two as to justify
a broad attempt to ad3
just the latter with reference to the former."

Yet the evidence seemed to disclose that many people believe there is a connection between one's wage and his morals,
and that therefore the legislation which increases his wage would
have a tendency to better his condition of living and make an
immoral life less attractive or desirable. The unreasonable
phases of the operation of the law referred to by Mr. Justice
Sutherland were proper to be considered by Congress in selecting
its remedy, but are not of controlling weight with the Court in
deciding on the existence of the congressional power. Admitting that the evil exists, it follows that Congress has the power
to eradicate it by legislation. By what kind of legislation? Is
it for the Court to decide what kind? Must the Court decide
that a complete eradication is necessary, or only a partial one?
Or must it say that X proposal will accomplish the desired results while Y proposal will not? If the Court is to decide these
matters, clearly the Court is usurping the functions of Congress
which would be constitutionally unjustifiable. If the Court
may not decide these matters what may it decide? It may decide only whether or not the statute is reasonably calculated to
cure the evil. If it cannot say that the law is palpably unreasonable, when viewed in connection with the evil it is designed
'(1923)

43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400.
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to cure, it should hold that the congressional power exists. If
the law is directed toward the evil and there exists any reasonable ground for saying that it is a corrective, then the power to
pass the statute exists, unless, of course, other positive constitutional inhibitions stand in the way. On the other hand if
there is no reasonable ground for such belief the power does not
exist. The only question for the Court to decide then is: Is
there reasonable ground to believe that this legislation is a corrective for this admitted evil? Many unreasonable features of
the law may be pointed out and many instances of its operation
being unfair and discriminatory may be shown, and yet the enactment may fairly well perform its office or accomplish the design of its framers. Any law can be shown to have unfair, unjust,
and unreasonable provisions. But these would not make it unconstitutional.
The fact that the legislative bodies of many states and foreign countries have enacted minimum wage legislation and that
leading economists and sociologists advocate such laws for the
improvement of the health and morals of the people, should be
adequate proof of the reasonableness of the enactment of such
legislation for the accomplishment of such objects. For after
all what is meant by the requirement of reasonableness in such
cases? It is not simply that there are reasonable men who believe that such a law will cure such an evil? It does not mean
that the judges of the court must believe that the law is adequate for the cure: for in that event the Court would be usurping
the power of the legislature to select its own curative measures.
Of course the judges of the Court are presumably reasonable
men, but human experience demonstrates that men differ as
to what corrective measures should be administered to the innumerable ills of society, and the Court ought not to foist its own
views upon the legislature. Rather, it should recognize that
if contrary views are held by any considerable body of men, such
views cannot be regarded as unreasonable. The Court should
accept the choice of the legislature on this question rather than
insist upon its own. We may assume that before the legislature
enacted the law in question, there were presented to it for consideration a number of different schemes designed to eradicate
this unhealthful condition of society. Upon examination of the
proposals it found some of them to be the projects of fanatics,
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and others to be the carefully devised plans of experts, some of
them perhaps being supported by a successful experience in
other states or countries. The legislature selected and enacted
into law the one of the latter which seemed most reasonable.
Now is the Supreme Court to say that such legislation is unconstitutional because the plan adopted seems to the members of the
Court unfit to accomplish the designs of its makers ? The question is not: Does the plan seem reasonable to the members of
the Court, but has the plan seemed reasonable to others whose
opinions are entitled to respect? If the legislature should adopt
the plan of a fanatic, or an untried scheme which could not claim
a respectable following, the enactment probably would be invalid, for in that event it could not claim to possess the merit of
reasonableness.
The view above set forth is supported by many decisions.
In Mugler v. Kansas4 where the constitutionality of a state prohibition law was before the Court, it was said:
"And so, if in the judgment of the legislature, the manufacture of
Intoxicating liquors for the maker's own use, as a beverage, would tend
to cripple, if it did not defeat, the effort to guard the community against
the evils attending the excessive use of such liquors, it is not for the
courts, upon their views as to what is best and safest for the community, to disregard the legislative determination of that question."

In Jacobsonv. Massachusetts it was contended that a compulsory vaccination law operated to deprive the plaintiff of his
constitutional liberty, but the Court thought otherwise, and in
setting forth the scope of the legislative power in matters of
public health, safety, or morals, said:
"We must assume that when the statute In question was passed, the
legislature of Massachusetts was not unaware of these opposing theories,
and was compelled of necessity to choose between them. It was not compelled to commit a matter involving the public health and safety to the
final decision of a court or jury. It is no part of the function of a court
or a jury to determine which one of two modes was likely to be the most
effective for the protection of the public against disease. That was for
the legislative department to determine in the light of all the Information it had or could obtain. It could not properly abdicate its function
to guard the public health and safety. The state legislature proceeded
upon the theory which recognized vaccination as at least an effective if
not the best known way in which to meet and suppress the evils of a
' (1887) 123 U. S. 623, 662.
5 (1905) 197 U. S. 11, 30. Other cases supporting the doctrine in
general are Holden v. Hardy (1898), 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. Ed. 780; Atkins
v. Kan. (1903), 191 U. S. 207, 48 L. Ed. 148; Minn. v. Barber (1890), 136
U. S. 313, 34 L. Ed. 455.
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smallpox epidemic that imperilled an entire population. Upon what
sound principles as to the relations existing between the different departments of government can the court review this action of the legislature?
If there is any such power in the judiciary to review legislative action
in respect of a matter affecting the general welfare, it can only be when
that which the legislature had done comes within the rule that if a
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the
public morals or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to
those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of
rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so
adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution."
But a case more nearly analagous to the case under discussion is Buntin v. Oregon.6

There was here involved the consti-

tutionality of a law limiting the working day of employees in
"mills, factories, and manufacturing establishments" to ten
hours. In holding the law constitutional, the court said:
"But we need not cast about for reasons for the legislative judgment. We are not required to be sure of the precise reasons for its exercise or be convinced of the wisdom of its exercise. . . . It is
enough for our decision if the legislation under review was passed in
the exercise of an admitted power of government; and that it is not
as complete as it might be, not as rigid in its prohibitions as it might be,
gives perhaps evasion too much play, is lighter in its penalties than it
might be, is no impeachment of its legality. This may be a blemish,
giving opportunity for criticism and difference in characterization, but
the constitutional validity of legislation cannot be determined by the
degree of exactness of its provisions or remedies. New policies are
usually tentative in their beginnings, advance in firmness as they advance in acceptance. They do not at a particular moment of time spring
full perfect in extent or means from the legislative brain. Time may
be necessary to fashion them to precedent customs and conditions and
as they justify themselves or otherwise they pass from militancy to
triumph or from question to repeal.""

The same doctrine is stated very forcibly by Mr. Justice
Harlan in his dissent to Lockner v. New York s in the following
language:
"I do not stop to consider whether any particular view of this
economic question presents the sounder theory. What the precise facts
are it may be difficult to say. It is enough for the determination of
this case, and it is enough for this court to know, that the question
is one about which there is room for debate and for an honest difference
of opinion. There are many reasons of weighty, substantial character,
based upon the experience of mankind, in support of the theory that,
all things considered, more than ten -hours' steady work each day, from
week to week, in a bakery or confectionery establishment, may endanger the health, and shorten the lives of the workmen, thereby diminishing their physical and mental capacity to serve the state, and to
provide for those dependent upon them."
(1917) 243 U. S. 426, 61 L. Ed. 830, Ann. Cas. 1918A 1043.
" Ibi 437, 43S.
8 (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 72,
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And by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in the same case
as follows: "
"It Is settled by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this,
and which equally with this interfere with the liberty to contract.
. . But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of
the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made for people of
fundamentally differeing views, and the accident of our finding certain
opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to
conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying
them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our
people and our law. It does not need research to show that no such
sweeping condemnation can be passed upon the statute before us. A
reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the score of health.
Mfen whom I certainly could not pronounce unreasonable would uphold
it as a first installment of a general regulation of the hours of work."

In applying the theory set forth in the above cited decisions
to the minimum wage case, it would seem fair to say that if it is
not unreasonable for one to believe that a prescription of minimum wages has a beneficial effect on morals and health it would
follow that Congress has power to enact a minimum wage law.
Ibia 75, 76.

